Abstract-There is an extensive literature on the success/failure of firm-funded R&D projects, but growing policy interest focuses on publicly funded R&D projects. We discuss this literature, which builds on a long stream of research of which Albert Rubenstein was a prime investigator, and use the literature to motivate the theoretical and empirical parts of the paper. Using data from 1878 Phase II R&D projects funded through the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, of which 624 had been discontinued prior to technical completion, we provide for the first time quantitative findings on the success/failure of publicly funded firm-performed R&D projects. Using a single-equation qualitative choice model, we find that prior R&D experience with the technology funded by SBIR projects, the amount of the SBIR award, and having a female as a principle investigator, other factors held constant, are all negatively related to the probability of project failure. In contrast, firm size is positively associated with project failure. We did not find evidence that human capital, experiential knowledge embodied in the firm conducting the R&D, or university involvement in the R&D project affected the probability of project failure. We discuss the implications of these findings for practice, policy, and further research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I
T IS widely accepted that technological change is the driver of economic growth and that investments in R&D are a critical input into the development of technology. For decades academics have studied characteristics of the R&D process ranging from the initial investment strategy of a firm to the impact of R&D investments on the firm, on its industry, and on overall national performance. Albert H. Rubenstein was a pioneer in this research notably in the areas of the design, coordination and funding of R&D, and interorganizational technology transfer programs and processes [1] , [2] .
In recent years, policy makers have turned their attention to the net social benefits associated with both private and public investments in R&D [3] , [4] . A related area of inquiry that has long been understudied is the failure of R&D; the antecedents, as well as the consequences of failed R&D projects. 1 Following the theoretical work of Lazear [6] on entrepreneurial behavior, as well as the foundational empirical research of Mansfield and Wagner [7] , Rubenstein et al. [8] and Teubal [9] , scholars in technology and engineering management have furthered this vein of research-much of which has been reviewed by Balachandra and Friar [10] and van der Panne et al. [11] -by focusing on the managerial and organizational strategy paradigms associated with the success/failure of firm-funded R&D projects.
Our point of departure from this body of the literature is to present, for the first time, findings on the success/failure of publicly funded firm-performed R&D projects. The general lack of evidence on the determinants of the success/failure of publicly funded R&D projects is an important omission given the level of resources, as well as the amount of policy attention devoted to such projects. Our focus on this aspect of the performance of publicly funded R&D project is especially timely in the United States in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Policy makers reemphasized the importance of program evaluation requirements-originally set forth in the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 (P.L. 103-62)-during their prolonged deliberations (from 2008 through 2011) of the reauthorization of the publicly funded U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program (to which the data analyzed in this paper pertain as discussed in Section II). 2 The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section II, we overview the SBIR program and the database of firm projects funded with public moneys through the SBIR program. This database was constructed by the National Research Council (NRC) within the National Academies. In Section III, based on the extant literature, we develop an empirical model, and formulate hypotheses to estimate the probability that a firm's SBIR-funded project fails, and we operationalize that model in Sections IV and V using the SBIR project data. Our paper concludes with a discussion of our findings in Section VI.
II. SBIR PROGRAM AND DATABASE
The National Science Foundation (NSF) began a program in 1977 to encourage small firms to participate in NSF-sponsored research that had commercial potential. In part because of its success, President Carter emphasized in his 1979 Domestic Policy Review the importance of small firm innovations and, thus, their potential role in reversing the productivity slowdown that characterized the U.S. private business sector at that time. Soon thereafter, Congress passed the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-219). It required all government agencies and departments with greater than $100 million in external research programs to establish their 2 Public accountability of the use of public resources, including public investments in R&D, was emphasized in this legislation. Prior to it, the U.S. Congress focused on fiscal accountability, but with GPRA the focus changed to performance accountability in order to improve federal program effectiveness, see Link and Scott [12] for a detailed discussion of public accountability legislation in the United States and of GPRA. own SBIR program and to allocate a portion of their public moneys for the purpose of, among other things, stimulating innovation in small (less than 500 employees) private-sector firms. 3 The objectives of the SBIR program, as stated in its enabling legislation, are to stimulate technological innovation in small private-sector firms, to use small private-sector firms to meet federal R&D needs, 4 to foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in the innovation process, 5 and to increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal R&D.
The SBIR program has been reauthorized several times since 1982. The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554) mandated that the NRC conduct an evaluation of the SBIR program as a precursor to the 2008 reauthorization. As part of the NRC's evaluation, in 2005 it administered a random survey of 6408 of the 11214 Phase II SBIR projects funded between 1992 and 2001. 6 To emphasize, the unit of observation in the NRC database is a firm-performed project funded with public moneys through the soliciting agency's SBIR program.
The NRC database is arguably the most complete database on U.S. publicly funded R&D projects in small firms [14] . Table I shows the number of respondents of completed or partially completed project-specific surveys by award-recipient firms that were funded by the five largest agencies, in descending order of size. 7 Of the 1878 Phase II projects surveyed, 624 of the firms conducting the publicly funded R&D reported that the funded project was not completed and had been discontinued. This represents a 33% failure rate, where failure is defined as selfreported discontinuation of the funded project. The reasons given on the NRC survey for discontinuation are several; 24% 3 See Link and Scott [13] for a detailed history of the SBIR program. 4 Each year each agency solicits proposals to its SBIR program to address agency determined topics. 5 Noteworthy is that the 1992 reauthorization broadened objective 3 above to focus on small firms that are majority owned by women. * * 6 Briefly, a Phase I award is given by an agency to a firm to establish the technical merits and feasibility for commercialization of its proposed R&D project. After the successful completion of a Phase I project, a firm can be invited to apply to the agency for a Phase II award. The objective of a Phase II project is to continue the research started during Phase I with the intent that the results from the Phase II R&D project will be commercialized. Typically, Phase II projects are capped at $1 million; however, at an agency's discretion the scope of a Phase II project can be expanded and the budget increased. 7 Link and Scott [13] have shown that the final sample of 1878 Phase II projects is random. There is no evidence of sample selection bias in the final sample of Phase II projects. responded that the primary reason, among several reasons given by respondents to the survey, was that the market demand for their technology appeared to be too small, another 15% responded that they had not received sufficient SBIR funding to complete the research; and another 14% responded that technical problems were encountered during the R&D. Thus, there are, for a discontinued R&D project, self-reported technical, as well as market/commercial reasons for a project being discontinued or failing. Regardless of the reasons for discontinuation, we simply treat a discontinued R&D project as a failed R&D project. 8 
III. ANALYTICAL MODEL
Our analytical model is formulated to identify covariates with the probability that an SBIR project failed. This inquiry is not intended to call into question the validity of the reasons given by the survey respondents for discontinuing their SBIR project. Rather, we seek to identify systematically project and firm characteristics associated with R&D failure, given the limitations of the NRC database, and then to generalize about an environment conducive for success of publicly funded firmperformed R&D projects conducted in small firms.
We posit a simple probability model of failure as
where Failure is a dichotomous variable, X is a vector of project and firm characteristics, I is the indicator function, and ε ∼ N(0,1). Table II defines the variables in (1). We focus on four independent variables to include in vector X: the firm's previous experience with SBIR projects, the size of the SBIR award, the size of the firm at the time of submitting its Phase II proposal, and the gender of the PI. Our focus on these independent variables follows from theory, as well as from the findings in the extant, but limited, academic literature. 9 In what follows, we set forth hypotheses concerning the relationships between these independent variables and the likelihood of failure. 10 Building on findings in the academic literature is quite appropriate for this study because previous scholars have also examined the success/failure of firm-performed R&D projects [10] , [11] . Our analysis differs in terms of the source of funding. The SBIR program uses public moneys to support the R&D of private-sector firms, so the organizational environment of the firm performing the R&D is comparable although the explicit R&D cost of the project is less.
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Human capital in the form of knowledge and awareness of innovative opportunities plays an important role in the innovation process [16] . From a theoretical perspective, Lazear's [6] model of entrepreneurial behavior shows that individuals with varying human capital acquired through experiential learning are more likely to act entrepreneurially and, thus, start their own business. To extrapolate from this conclusion, it follows that the lack of such human capital or experiential knowledge in entrepreneurs that do pursue such activities are less likely to be successful. Building on the work of Penrose [17] , management scholars (e.g., [18] - [20] ) have argued that firms can be viewed as bundles of resources and capabilities that are not easily imitated. Thus, a firm's human capital resources and capabilities constitute a source of its sustainable competitive advantage be it in R&D or in other strategic dimensions.
Wilson et al. [21] extend this argument to the determinants of failure in start-ups generally and showed that start-ups with directors who have developed their human capital through greater industry experience are significantly less likely to fail. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: Firms that embody greater experiential knowledge are less likely to fail in their R&D project efforts, other factors held constant.
To complement this hypothesis, we note that there is a rich literature related to R&D success and R&D experience. For example, Kumar et al. [22] showed that the technical capabilities of a firm are positively related to its ability to resolve unforeseen problems in an R&D project. Similarly, van der Panne et al. [11] cited numerous papers that similarly concluded that a firm's experience with innovation is positively correlated with the technological viability of its R&D projects. Thus, we hypothesize based on theory and related empirical evidence:
Hypothesis 1b: Firms that embody greater R&D experience with the technology being funded are less likely to fail in their R&D project efforts, other factors held constant.
The NRC database allows us to measure a firm's R&D experience in two ways: 1) by the number of previous Phase II awards (related to any technology); and 2) by the number of previous Phase II awards related to the technology supported by the current Phase II SBIR award.
The motivation for the other independent variables comes from the extant literature. The inclusion of the size of the award is the 15% who responded to the survey that they (meaning the project) had not received sufficient funding to complete the research. With reference to the academic literature, other studies that examined the impact of the level of R&D tangentially focused on the per se probability of success or failure of a project. Financing challenges can influence success or failure of innovation [8] . Mansfield and Wagner [7] showed that the level of early-on self-financed R&D spending was negatively correlated with the probability that a firm's R&D project would be technically successful, and given technical completion that it would then successfully commercialize the innovation. Held constant in their regression model is when the R&D project was evaluated from a profitability perspective and where the idea for the R&D project originated (in R&D or in marketing).
In comparison, Rubenstein et al. [8] found from a systematic analysis of a sample of R&D projects that the level of resources available for an R&D project positively affects the overall success of the project. Similarly, Calantone et al. [23] examined survey responses from very large firms about their success in new product development, and they found a positive correlation between success and the technical skills and resources within the firm. In both of these studies, resources included financial resources, as well as experiential resources so the comparison of their findings to ours (above) is complementary but not exact.
We make no prediction on the correlation between the probability of failure and the size of the SBIR award based on findings in the literature; but based on the NRC survey responses regarding a reason for termination of the SBIR project we do predict a negative relationship. That is, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Firms that obtain larger awards are less likely to fail in their R&D project efforts, other factors held constant.
We also considered the size of the firm as an independent variable, measured in terms of number of employees. On the one hand, larger small firms may be more mature in their managerial abilities and, thus, can exert relatively more due diligence over R&D projects. This would suggest that the correlation between the probability of failure and the level of firm employment is negative. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3a: Larger small firms in terms of employment are less likely to fail in their R&D project efforts, other factors held constant.
On the other hand, because our sampling population consists of small firms, with on average only about 30 employees, their management structure may be stretched thin and, thus, due diligence in any activity, especially an R&D activity which by its very nature is characterized by unexpected situations, may come at a premium. Thus, we predict that the correlation between the probability of failure and the level of firm employment is positive, but perhaps nonlinear. 12 In other words, we formulate an alternative hypothesis: Hypothesis 3b: Larger small firms in terms of employment are more likely to fail in their R&D project efforts, other factors held constant.
The gender of the PI is also considered as an independent variable. The inclusion of this variable allows us to forge new ground in the technology and managerial engineering literature. While this variable is new to this literature, it is well known that there are significant gender differences among academics in the commercialization of science [25] , [26] . There is also related evidence presented by Wilson et al. [21] , [27] that the likelihood of bankruptcy of a new start-up and of a family business decreases with gender diversity on the Board of Directors, other factors held constant. Gender diversity is associated with less risk taking as women are generally more risk aware [28] , and with more innovative and critical thinking in problem solving [29] that may be especially important in the uncertain context of R&D projects. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: Firms with female PIs are less likely to fail in their R&D project efforts, other factors held constant.
IV. FINDINGS
Descriptive statistics on all of the variables are in Table III. Note that data on all of the variables of consideration were available for only 1652 of the 1878 project in the NRC database. Selection bias-in this case, selection from the sampling population of 1878 SBIR projects to the sample of 1652 projects, for which all relevant data were available-is always a concern in empirical research. However, it has been previously shown that selection bias is not an issue with this database [13] , [30] . Simplistically, there is no statistical difference between the mean value of Failure and the mean value of Award in the random sample of 1878 and the subsample of 1652. 13 The correlation matrix of the variables is in Table IV . Probit estimates of (1) are presented in Table V . Award and Employment are allowed to enter the equation linearly and nonlinearly. The findings from our estimation of (1) are consistent across specification.
First, a firm's prior experience with SBIR funded projects reduces the probability of failure. However, this relationship is only statistically significant for prior experience with R&D projects related to the technology being funded, which is consistent with studies that find that firms' technical expertize is associated with the viability of R&D. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 1b but not Hypothesis 1a.
Second, as expected, the amount of the SBIR award is negatively related to the probability of failure, and this relationship appears to be nonlinear. In other words, increases in the award amount decrease the probability that the funded project will fail. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 2.
Third, larger firms (that is, larger small firms) have a greater probability of a funded R&D project failing, and this relationship is also nonlinear. This supports our argument that the larger firms in the sample are stretched thin, and are unable to manage the uncertainty that characterizes R&D and supports Hypothesis 3b rather than Hypothesis 3a.
In addition, fourth, projects with a female PI enjoy a smaller probability of failure than those led by a male PI, providing support for Hypothesis 4. As we noted above, consideration of gender in R&D project leadership has not previously been examined. Thus, this finding should probably be interpreted herein as an interesting observation, but additional research is clearly needed to understand gender differences in the management of research uncertainty; we return to this point below.
With the exception of gender, a variable new to this literature, our findings from a sample of publicly funded firmperformed R&D projects is consistent with other studies of firm-funded firm-performed R&D project. Thus, at this initial and perhaps exploratory level, one might conclude that that the source of funding is not relevant to the performance of R&D projects.
V. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES
Additional variables were considered in other specifications of (1).
14 For example, the human capital and experiential knowledge embodied in the firm entered alternative versions of (1) in two ways. As technical and commercial expertize may influence the success or failure of innovation [8] , we first considered dichotomously if any of the firm's founders has a business background, and we considered if any of the firm's founders had an academic background. Founders with a business background are likely to benefit from experience with their previous employer [31] , [32] . They are more likely to have the knowledge and resources to pursue projects that are nearer to market and which are more likely to be commercially viable than might be expected to be the case for those with academic experience [33] . In neither case was the estimated relationship significant.
As organizational contexts may influence the success or failure of R&D projects [1] , [2] , we also quantified the R&D experience attendant to the project by including a binary variable indicating if a university was involved in the project (either faculty or equipment). As with the previous variable, universities may be less likely to possess the commercial expertize to develop R&D projects, and projects in universities may be more likely to be generic and distant from markets [33] , [34] . This variable also did not enter (1) significantly.
VI. DISCUSSION
Building on a long stream of research of which Albert Rubenstein was a prime investigator, our study has extended the analysis of the financial, behavioral, and organizational influences on the success of R&D. Our findings have a number of implications for policy and practice. The potential contribution of the lack of experience of small firms in formulating R&D budgets toward the failure of projects suggests several possible needs. On the one hand, public agencies that have a managerial performance objective related to technical completion rates might include explicitly prior research experience as a criterion for receiving funding. On the other hand, to embrace the spirit of the creative ability of new firms, initiating a mentoring program might receive policy support. In the case of projects involving universities and academics, Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) may potentially play an important mentoring role, although the extent to which this might be effective may depend upon the expertize of the TTOs [34] . Our finding of the importance of technical expertize suggests the need for TTO mentors to have specific expertize, and to be devolved to aiding individual science and engineering departments. Similarly, academic colleagues who have prior entrepreneurial experience or experience with SBIR projects may be incentivized to play a mentoring role [35] , particularly in those academic departments that value commercialization [36] .
A. Limitations of This Research
As with all studies, this study has limitations. First, our analysis is based upon only one public-sector R&D program, the SBIR program, and as such the findings may not be generalizable to other public-sector programs. Second, we were unable to examine the characteristics of female PIs. Third, we did not find significant effects of the business background of founders, but we do not have data on their seniority or degree of success in these previous roles. Fourth, while we failed to find a significant effect from the presence of a university, universities are heterogeneous in their approaches to research, and this focus need not necessarily complement commercialization efforts.
B. Further Research
Our analysis and its limitations give rise to a number of topics for further research. First, there is scope to examine other public-sector programs in other contexts. Second, further research might usefully examine in more depth the characteristics of female PIs. For example, there is evidence of differences in the seniority of male versus female academics engaged in the commercialization of science [26] . Third, further research might usefully undertake more fine-grained analyses of founders' prior business background. For example, some founders may have had prior entrepreneurial experience, and the nature and extent of this experience may reduce the likelihood of failure [37] . There may be differences depending on whether founders' previous experience was successful or not. While some may learn from prior failure experience others may not or they may only learn imperfectly [21] . Fourth, with respect to universities, further research might usefully adopt a more fine-grained approach by exploring, on the one hand, whether the type of university (e.g., Research One universities versus other universities) and, on the other hand, whether the nature of the expertize in TTOs [34] influences the success/failure of R&D projects. 15 
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have presented for the first time findings on the success/failure of publicly funded firm-performed R&D projects. We find general support for our hypotheses. Specifically, we have shown that the likelihood of a firm failing in its R&D project efforts will be significantly reduced by a firm's previous R&D experience with the technology being funded by the SBIR project, the size of the SBIR award and the gender of the PI, but will be significantly increased by the size of the firm at the time of submitting its Phase II proposal. As such our findings help extend a long tradition of studies of the success or failure of R&D projects. 
